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要 旨
　Bolleyer, N.（₂₀₁₃）は，民主主義国家として長い歴史を有し（old democracies），また安定した政党
システム（old party system）を有する₁₇の西洋諸国の事例分析から，起業家（entrepreneurial）型及
び組織支援（rooted）型という二つの新党の類型を提示した．組織支援型の方が起業家型より，選挙に
おいて安定した支持を継続的に得ることが可能であり，また政党を維持することが可能であると述べて
いる．本論文は，Bolleyer の類型を基に，日本の民主党の事例分析により，Bolleyer の類型が民主党の
事例に当てはまるのか，そして，その場合，民主党はどちらの類型に属すのか検証する．Bolleyer の類
型を提示する上で，考慮していない日本の新党の分析は，西洋諸国以外の事例の新たな考察を提供し，
Bolleyer の類型の更なる発展に貢献できると考える．
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4Ⅰ．Introduction
　　There are two main streams of research in the recent literature on new political parties.₁） The 
first stream analyzes the causes of new party formation.₂） The other examines new partiesʼ 
performance based on their origins.₃）One of the most inﬂuential recent studies in the second stream 
is by Bolleyer.₄） Bollyerʼs theoretical argument is one of the latest studies updating Panebiancoʼs 
classic pioneering work.₅） Bollyer analyzes more countries, more parties, and longer period with using 
both statistics and case study analysis than that covered by Panebianco. Therefore, Bollyerʼs study 
enhanced the utility of the theoretical framework in wider contexts. 
　　Bolleyer distinguishes between two new party types, rooted and entrepreneurial parties. Rooted 
new parties are new parties that have ʻties to already existing organizationsʼ promoting party 
formation.₆） On the other hand, entrepreneurial new parties are formed by ʻindividuals who are not 
afﬁliated to any already organized societal groupsʼ.₇） Through analysis of new parties formed in ₁₇ 
advanced democratic countries from ₁₉₆₈ to ₂₀₁₁, Bolleyer ﬁnds that rooted new parties have greater 
electoral sustainability and survive longer than entrepreneurial new parties because rooted parties 
have advantages in the process of institutionalization.₈）    
　　While Bolleyerʼs study has great value, one weakness is her choice of cases. All of the ₁₇ 
democracies she analyzes are advanced democracies in Western Europe and all with old and 
relatively stable party systems. One obvious example is her exclusion of Italy. Bolleyer explains that 
the omission of Italy was because of disintegration of party system in the ₁₉₉₀s.₉） New democratic 
counties such as the post-communist democracies Eastern European are not included. Neither does 
her analysis include any Asian countries. Of course, few Asian countries are not advanced democratic 
countries. Japan, however, is an advanced democratic country though, like Italy, one in which the 
party system disintegrated in ₁₉₉₀s. 
　　This paper aims to develop Bolleyerʼs theoretical framework by examining the formation of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), one of excluded cases in Bollyerʼs study. Extending her theory to 
these cases should contribute to testing of the validity of her theory in a wider context and provide 
further insights into the formation, success, and maintenance of new parties. Most importantly, the 
cases of Japan and Italy, advanced democracies in which the party system disintegrated and had to 
be reconstructed, i.e., old democracies with “new” party systems, have worth to be analyzed within 
this framework. 
　　The DPJ is one of the most successful new parties in any democracy. The DPJ achieved electoral 
sustainability rapidly and became the ruling party only ₁₃ years after its formation. Therefore, the 
DPJ is a good case to examine link between a new partyʼs success and its origin.  
　　In this paper, I argue that Bolleyerʼs theoretical framework does apply to Japan and explain the 
DPJʼs success. Ties with labor unions and kouenkai are keys for the DPJ emergence and electoral 
sustainability. Hijino argues that the DPJ is an entrepreneurial party without societal roots, the 
same as the New Frontier Party (Shinshin-Tou, NFP), Your Party (Minnano-Tou) and the Japan 
Restoration Party (Nihon Ishin no Kai).₁₀） All of these new parties, including the DPJ, were top-down 
Ikeda：Rooted or Entrepreneurial Formation?・・・ 5
formations led by elites.₁₁） One cannot deny the importance of entrepreneurs such as Hatoyama 
Yukio, Kan Naoto and Ozawa Ichiro in the process of the DPJ formation and success.
　　However, the DPJ has not depended upon the charisma or individual popularity of any of these 
leaders and has survived the failures of each and the defection of Ozawa. The DPJ has roots in 
societal organizations as labor unions and kouenkai. These roots were also important in the original 
success of the party and have been much more important than leaders in the sustainability of that 
success. Most clearly, it has been the support of labor unions that have sustained the party in hard 
times. 
　　In this paper, I first review the literature on new party formation and success focusing on 
Bolleyerʼs perspective. Second, I explain the DPJ success by analyzing its electoral sustainability and 
persistence. Third, I examine the roles of entrepreneurs in the DPJ formation. Fourth, I discuss 
aspects of the DPJ rooted formation by focusing on role of labor union and kouenkai.
Ⅱ． Types of New Parties, Party Origins and Success
　　 The pioneering work classifying political parties is by Duverger.₁₂）Duverger distinguishes 
between internally and externally created parties. Internally created parties are top-down formation 
by ʻa loose group of parliamentary notablesʼ.₁₃⎠ Sartori classiﬁed top-down internally created parties 
as ʻlegislative-electoral partiesʼ.₁₄⎠ On the other hand, externally created parties are bottom-up 
creation from a pre-existing base such as trade unions.₁₅⎠ Harmel and Robertson provide different 
views of new party types by analyzing ₂₃₃ new parties in ₁₉ West Europe and Anglo-American 
democratic counties from ₁₉₆₀ to ₁₉₈₀.₁₆⎠ They distinguish three types of new parties; mergers, splits 
and natural formations. In the same line, in addition to mergers and splits, Mair offers a new party 
type as ʻgenuinely newʼ formed by neither merger nor split.₁₇⎠ In the post-communist context, 
Ishiyama introduced the concept of ʻsuccessor partyʼ.₁₈⎠ Successor party is a party that is a legally new 
but inherited some part of the original party. 
　　Party origins and party types have also been linked to the degree of party success. How parties 
are formed in the ﬁrst place inﬂuences the availability of organizational resources for new parties.₁₉⎠ 
As noted above, Bolleyer categorized new parties into two types; entrepreneurial and rooted. 
　　Entrepreneurial formation is a new party formation by individuals without afﬁliation to existing 
extra-parliamentary organizations lead new party formation.₂₀⎠ New parties fromed by entrepreneurs 
cannot rely on ties to existing societal groups as a support base.₂₁⎠ The role of leaders is more 
important in party formation.₂₂⎠ The party is a vehicle for the leader to pursuit his or her own goals 
and party policy reﬂects the entrepreneurʼs policy. 
　　On the other hand, rooted formation is new party formation by existing societal organizations.₂₃⎠︐ ₂₄⎠ 
Rooted new parties thus have ties with these societal organizations and roots in them. Rooted new 
parties are likely to survive longer than have greater electoral sustainability and organizational 
persistence for longer term than entrepreneurial new parties.₂₅） Electoral sustainability is political 
partyʼs capacity to ʻmaintain and consolidate a certain level of electoral support over timeʼ.₂₆） 
6Maintaining certain level of support led maintaining certain amount of seats in the Diet and survival 
of new parties for longer term. Green parties are an example of rooted formation.
　　Among ₂₈ Green and new religious parties formed from ₁₉₆₉ and ₂₀₁₁, ₃  of them were 
entrepreneurial formations while ₂₅ parties were formed by existing societal organizations and 
regarded as ʻrooted partiesʼ.₂₇） Among them, no entrepreneurial Green parties proved sustainable 
while ₁₉ of rooted Green parties proved sustainable.₂₈⎠
　　Rooted formation produces many advantages for electoral sustainability. First, extra-
parliamentary organizations stabilize support base of party organizations and contribute to the 
maintenance of electoral support.₂₉⎠ Members of the extra-parliamentary organizations tend to vote 
for political parties supported by their organizations. The organization also mobilizes voters. To 
mobilize votes in elections, political parties need to carry out various activities such as canvassing 
and telephone calls. Existing extra-parliamentary support organizations help this process by 
providing resources such as volunteer staff for carrying out these tasks. 
　　Extra-parliamentary organizations also increase the capacity of political parties to recruit 
candidates.₃₀⎠ When political parties do not have enough members and supporters, they have 
difﬁculties in nominating candidates in all constituencies.₃₁⎠ When societal organizations form local 
branches, the organization helps recruit candidates.₃₂⎠ Especially, after a new partyʼs breakthrough, 
candidate recruitment helps maintain sustainability.₃₃⎠ Nominating candidates is an important 
element in that more loyal members have positions in the government.₃₄⎠
　　Another contribution of extra-parliamentary support organizations is institutionalization.₃₅⎠︐₃₆⎠ 
Institutionalization has two dimensions, value infusion and routinization.₃₇⎠︐₃₈⎠︐₃₉⎠ Value infusion is 
shifts members from the pursuit of their own individual goals to the pursuit of collective 
organizational interests as political parties and encourages party members to follow initiatives by 
sharing collective interests.₄₀⎠ Routinization refers ʻinternal rules and patterns of behavior become 
regularized and entrenched ʼ . ₄₁⎠ Routinization regulates behavior of party members. ₄₂⎠ 
Institutionalization is crucial to organizational persistence of political party. Organizational 
persistence means party unity without disintegration survival of political party without 
disintegration.₄₃⎠ When parties split, electoral support for the original party is likely to decrease.₄₄⎠
　　Based on the theory between origins of new parties and their electoral success in the current 
literature, I next analyze the DPJ electoral stability and the DPJ formation. 
Ⅲ．DPJ Electoral Sustainability 
　　The DPJ was founded in ₁₉₉₆, the DPJ, with minor name changes, several mergers and 
defections, survived until the formation of the Minshin-tou (the Democratic Party, DP) in ₂₀₁₆. The 
DPJ was a successful new party with electoral sustainability and persistence soon after its 
breakthrough. The DPJ experienced a disintegration crisis in July ₂₀₁₂ when ₅₂ members of the 
Ozawa group, ₄₀ members in the lower house and ₁₂ members in the upper house.₄₅） The secession of 
the Ozawa group did not, however, lead to the dissolution of the DPJ.
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　　One way to measure electoral stability is the percentage of votes in national elections.₄₆） Bolleyer 
set a minimum threshold for sustainability is ₄%.₄₇） Figure ₁  shows the percentage of votes the DPJ 
had in the lower house election from ₁₉₉₆ to ₂₀₁₄. Figure ₂  shows the DPJ percentage of votes in the 
upper house election from ₁₉₉₈ to ₂₀₁₃. 
　　In each lower and upper election, the DPJ had over ₁₀ per cent votes in both the electoral 
districts and in the proportional representation (PR) tier. In lower house election, the percentage of 
votes in PR and the single member districts (SMD) reached the peak in ₂₀₀₉. The percentage of votes 
in PR was ₄₂.₄₁ % while it in SMD was ₄₇.₄₃%. Votes dramatically decreased from the ₂₀₀₉ and ₂₀₁₂ 
lower house election. However, the DPJ still had over ₁₅ % votes in SMD and PR tiers. In upper 
house election, the DPJ had over ₃₅ % votes in electoral districts in ₂₀₀₄, ₂₀₀₇ and ₂₀₁₀. In the ₂₀₁₃ 
Figure ₁ 　The percentage of votes for the DPJ in the lower house election
 (unit:%)
　Source: Asahi Shinbun
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Figure ₂ 　The percentage of votes for the DPJ in the lower house election
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8upper house election, the percentage of votes decreased. However, the DPJ still maintained ₁₆.₃ % in 
electoral districts and ₁₃.₄ % in PR. The DPJ has survived serious defections and disastrous defeats. 
It has proven its sustainability. 
Ⅳ．The Roles of Entrepreneurs in the DPJ Formation
　　The DPJ was formed in ₁₉₉₆ by members of the SDP, Sakigake, the Citizenʼs League (Shimin 
League) and several independents. Entrepreneurs clearly led the process of founding the new party. 
Their aim was to build a strong opposition party capable of competing with the LDP. The leading 
ﬁgures were Hatoyama and Kan both from Sakigake. 
　　After its formation, the DPJ has two turning points in ₁₉₉₈ and ₂₀₀₃. In ₁₉₉₈, NFP disintegrated 
and many of the parties emerged from its remnants. Many of those remnants, including the Min-
sei-tou (the Good Governance party), Shintou Yuai (the New Fraternity Party) and the Minkairen (the 
Democratic Reform Party) later joined the DPJ. Through this merger, the DPJ became the second 
largest party in the Diet. In ₂₀₀₃, the Jiyu-tou (the Liberal Party) led by Ozawa also merged into the 
DPJ. All of these mergers were accomplished through elite negotiation. 
　₁.   The Formation of the DPJ in ₁₉₉₆
　　The impetus leading to the formation of the DPJ began with the coalition government that 
included both the LDP and the JSP. The leader of the JSP, Murayama Tomiichi, was appointed as 
the Prime Minister in ₁₉₉₄ in a coalition government with the LDP and Sakigake. Murayama was 
forced to change JSP policy to ﬁt the needs of the coalition government. Since its formation, the JSP 
had maintained the policy of opposing the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, the Japan-US Security 
Treaty and nuclear power plants but the party had to abandon these positions during the coalition 
government. 
　　After this policy shift, tensions within the party increased and the idea of forming a new party 
gained support. Yamahana Sadao attempted but failed to form a new party under his own leadership. 
On ₂₇ May ₁₉₉₅, following discussions among the JSP cabinet members, Murayama announced that 
the JSP would seek to form a new party to restore the JSP and create a new force in opposition to the 
LDP.₄₈）
　　On ₉  August ₁₉₉₅, Murayama sought the cooperation of Sakigake because Sakigake had a 
similar plan for forming a liberal party with wider non-LDP and non-NFP participation.₄₉⎠ The head 
of Sakigake, Takekmura Masayoshi also sought cooperation with the JSP.₅₀） However, there was 
opposition from within both parties. Some JSP members opposed the idea of forming a new party. 
Hatoyama in Sakigake was also reluctant to cooperate with the JSP.₅₁⎠ Sakigake opposed new party 
formation under JSP leadership and suggested a new plan of new party formation under Takemuraʼs 
leadership.₅₂⎠ However, the JSP opposed new party formation under the leadership of Sakigake. 
　　While JSP and Sakigake were experiencing difﬁculties, Hatoyama proceeded with his own new 
party plan.₅₃⎠ Hatoyama and Funada Hajime of the NFP cooperated on a plan to form a new party in 
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April ₁₉₉₆ and Kan in Sakigake supported this plan. Murayama state that forming a new party with 
Funada would be impossible because Funada was a member of Shinshin-tou and a conservative.₅₄⎠ 
　　In addition, conﬂicts between Hatoyama and Takemura over leadership for new party formation 
increased. Funada and Hatoyama Kunio (Hatoyama Yukioʼs brother） in NFP refused to participate 
in the party if it included Sakigake as a whole in order to avoid a Sakigake group or faction with in 
the new party.₅₅⎠ However, Funada suddenly decided not to join the new party because he hoped to 
form a new conservative rather than a liberal party.₅₆⎠ The new party plan led by Hatoyama and 
Funada thus failed. 
　　After this failure, Hatoyama Yukio left Sakigake and sought a new party formation with Kan. On 
₁₀ September ₁₉₉₆, Kan and Hatoyama Yukio called for the establishment of the preparatory 
committee for the new party. In their ﬁrst meeting, they decided the new party would be named the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The “spirit of yuai” (fraternity) and “citizen liberalism” would be 
the DPJʼs doctrine. The “spirit of yuai” (fraternity) is a philosophy Hatoyama inherited from his 
grandfather and former Prime Minister, Hatoyama Ichiro.₅₇⎠ 
　　The DPJ refused to allow either Takemura or Murayama into the DPJ.₅₈⎠ Because of this refusal, 
neither Sakigake nora the SDP could join the DPJ as parties. Both were forced to allow participation 
in the DPJ to depend upon the individual choices of their members.₅₉⎠ 
　　The preparatory committee for the DPJ was formed on ₁₇ September. Fifty Diet members 
joined.₆₀⎠ Takemura and other Sakigake members in signiﬁcant positions such as Sonoda Hiroyuki, 
secretary general, did not join. On ₂₈ September, the DPJ announced ofﬁcial formation of the party. 
　　Entrepreneurs as Kan and Hatoyama played crucial roles in the DPJ formation in ₁₉₉₆. The DPJ 
was a vehicle designed to ensure the survival of its founding members. The SDP faced a crisis of 
declining support rates that threated its survival. For Sakigake, a very small party, cooperation 
among opposition parties was crucial for its survival. The DPJ clearly had aspects of a ʻHatoyama 
enterpriseʼ. Hatoyama exercised control over many aspects of the formation of the DPJ. For instance, 
refusing to allow Murayama and Takemura to join the party strongly reflected Hatoyamaʼs 
preferences. Furthermore, policy of the DPJ doctrine, “spirit of yuai” (fraternity) was Hatoyamaʼs 
policy. 
　₂.   The New DPJ in ₁₉₉₈ 
　　After the formation of the DPJ in ₁₉₉₆, Hatoyama and Kan sought cooperation with other 
opposition parties. On ₂₂ January ₁₉₉₇, Hatoyama, Kan and Hata Tsutomu, the head of Taiyou-Tou 
(Sun Party), reached an agreement to form a joint parliamentary group in the future and hold regular 
meetings.₆₁） 
　　The DPJ also sought to form parliamentary groups with NFP and the SDP. Hatoyama, Hata and 
Hosokawa Morihiro from NFP formed a study group, Kaikaku Kaigi (Association for Reform). The 
DPJ, NFP and Taiyou-tou agreed to cooperate the ₁₉₉₈ upper house election.₆₂⎠
　　On ₂₈ December ₁₉₉₈, NFP decided to dissolve on the ₃₁st. Expectations for reorganizing the 
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opposition forces was high.₆₃⎠ On ₃₁ December, the leaders of six opposition parties, including the 
DPJ, Shintou Yuai (New Fraternity Party), Minkairen (Democratic Reform Party), Taiyou-tou, From 
Five and Kokumin no Koe (Voice from Citizens) agreed to form a new party by the upper house 
election in ₁₉₉₈.₆₄⎠Both Shintou Yuai and Kokumin no Koe were remnants of the NFP. 
　　In February, Kokumin no Koe, Taiyou-tou and From Five formed a new party, Minsei-tou (Good 
Governance Party). On ₁₂ March, the DPJ, Minsei-tou, Shintou Yuai and Minkairen agreed to 
ofﬁcially form a new party in April. Participants numbered around ₁₄₀ Diet members.₆₅⎠ The scale of 
the new party would be second largest following to the LDP with ₃₇₈ Diet members.₆₆⎠ Though these 
parties merged to form a new party, the “merger” actually involved many small parties joining the 
DPJ. DPJ local branches were not dissolved.₆₇⎠ The “New DPJ” was ofﬁcially formed on ₁₃ April. 
　₃.   The Merger with the Liberal Party in ₂₀₀₃
　　After the dissolution of NFP, Ozawa Ichiro formed the Liberal Party (Jiyu-tou, LP) on ₆  January 
₁₉₉₈. The party began with ₅₄ Diet members, ₄₂ in the lower house and ₁₂ in the upper house.₆₈） The 
Liberal Party did not cooperate with the DPJ immediately after its formation but soon both parties 
sought cooperation. However, the Liberal Party and the DPJ soon decided to cooperate. For the LP, 
cooperation would help ensure their survival. For the DPJ, cooperation was crucial for the DPJ for 
winning the next general election.₆₉⎠ In the ₂₀₀₀ lower house election, the DPJ and the LP cooperated 
in Ishikawa ₂ nd district where the Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro held a seat.₇₀⎠ 
　　After the ₂₀₀₁ upper house election, cooperation between the DPJ and Liberal Party 
strengthened. Hatoyama planned to form a new party with the Liberal Party.₇₁⎠ However, this 
Hatoyama plan was not approved by the DPJ. Hatoyama resigned the DPJ head on ₁₃ December and 
Kan was elected the new leader. 
　　On ₁₉ February, the DPJ and the Liberal Party agreed to set up a committee to discuss a merger. 
They agreed to decide the merger issue by the end of the local elections in April. Meanwhile, the DPJ 
and Liberal Party decided to cooperate in the next general election in over ₁₀₀ districts.₇₂） They 
reached an agreement on joint candidates (touitsu kouho） in ₃₄ SMDs,₇₃） ₂₂ from the DPJ and ₁₂ from 
the Liberal Party.₇₄⎠ 
　　In May ₂₀₀₃, the DPJ and Liberal Party formed a joint parliamentary group. Okada Katsuya, the 
DPJ Secretary General, hoped that the joint parliamentary group would be the ﬁrst step toward new 
party formation with merger.₇₅⎠ However, the Liberal Party refused the merger. On July ₂₀₀₃, Kan 
suggested a new plan to Ozawa. He suggested that Liberal Party dissolve and members should 
participate as individuals.₇₆⎠ Ozawa agreed to dissolve the Liberal Party and merge by the end of 
September.₇₇⎠ The Liberal Party was broken up and merged into the DPJ on ₂₄ September ₂₀₀₃ 
bringing ₂₂ lower house members and ₈  upper house members to the DPJ.₇₈⎠ Consequently, the 
number of the DPJ Diet member increased from ₁₇₄ to ₂₀₄.₇₉⎠ 
　　The formation of the new DPJ in ₁₉₉₈ and ₂₀₀₃ was top-down decision by party leaders, just as 
図 2　「社会的経済」の構成
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was the original formation of the DPJ in ₁₉₉₆. The decisions by other parties to join the DPJ were 
designed to ensure the political survival of their various members. During this period, Hatoyama and 
Kan played key roles in reaching agreements among other party leaders. The DPJ grew by bringing 
other opposition parties into the party in both ₁₉₉₈ and ₂₀₀₃. The participation of Ozawa brought 
several beneﬁts to the DPJ. Ozawa improved the DPJ electoral strategy and contributed to increase 
the DPJ seats. These roles of entrepreneurs were keys to both the formation of the DPJ and its 
growth into the largest opposition force. 
　　However, even though entrepreneurs played key roles in paty formation and growth does not 
mean that the DPJ is an entrepreneurial party with no roots in societal organizations. The DPJ is not 
as same as the New Frontier Party (Shinshin-Tou, NFP), Your Party (Minnano-Tou) or the Japan 
Restoration Party (Nihon Ishin no Kai).₈₀） One important difference between the DPJ and these 
entrepreneurial new parties are existence of roots in societal organizations. In the process of the DPJ 
formation, societal organizations were involved and play a role in supporting the DPJ. They are key 
for the DPJ survival. I now turn to a discussion of the rootedness of the DPJ. 
Ⅴ．The DPJ’s Roots in the Extra-Parliamentary Organizations
　　Entrepreneurs played key roles in forming the DPJ. The DPJ formation was formed to ensure 
the survival of the participating politicians and to create a strong opposition force. However, the DPJ 
has roots in extra-parliamentary organizations. Labor unions and candidatesʼ personal support 
organizations, kouenkai, were the two main types of extra-parliamentary organizations involved in 
the formation of the DPJ. The DPJ is rooted in these two types of organizations. 
　　Labor unions did not play the central role in forming the DPJ but were not only inﬂuential but 
also necessary to the success of the party. Unions have served as the primary organizational support 
base of the party since it was founded. The unions sponsor and take responsibility for electing 
candidates from within their own organizations (soshikinai kouho) nominated by the DPJ. This helps 
maintain a minimum number of DPJ Diet members. 
　　Kouenkai are organized by and belong to particular candidates. They can be passed on to a 
successor with varying success, especially when the successor is a relative of the retiring candidate. 
They are also portable in varying degrees, following the candidate if the candidate changes parties. 
When established candidates from other parties joined the DPJ, they thus brought their own 
organizations with them and those organizations supported the DPJ as long as the candidate 
remained in the party. 
　₁.   Involvement of Labor Union in the DPJ Formation
　　When Yamahana decided to form a new party, some labor unions as Zen Dentsu (currently, The 
All NTT Workers Union of Japan) supported the movement but others, such as Zentei (currently, The 
Japan Postal Workersʼ Union) did not. However, following the delay of the new party formation, the 
labor unions that supported Yamahana decided to re-evaluate his plan and seek a new party with a 
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wider range of people.₈₁） These unions began to insist that the new party should be formed based on 
the JSP policy group.₈₂⎠ Given wider JSP support for a new party, some labor unions such as Zentei 
switched from supporting Yamahana to supporting a broader new party.₈₃⎠
　　After Yamahana left the JSP because of the failure of his new party plan, the JSP continued to 
seek to form a new party. Many labor unions, including Zen Dentsu, supported the JSPʼs new party 
movement.₈₄⎠ 
　　On ₇  August, ₂₁ unions, including Jichiro (The All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers 
Union), Zen Dentsu, Nikkyouso (Japan Teachersʼ Union) and Denkirengo (Japanese Electrical 
Electronic and Information Union) reached an agreement to form a new liberal party under the 
leadership of the labor unions.₈₅⎠ This was separate movement from the new party formation by the 
JSP. They established Minshu Liberal Shintou Kessei Suishin Rouso Kaigi (The council of labor 
unions to promote the liberal new party).₈₆⎠ Labor unions doubted that the JSP could form a new 
party by the next lower house election.₈₇⎠ If the JSP failed, the LDP and NFP would become the two 
major parties and neither represented the union voice in policy making.₈₈⎠
　　By ₁₉₉₆ a new party formation under Hatoyama and Kan leadership had become a more realistic 
proposition. Labor Unions supporting the SDP formed groups such as Shamin-tou to Renkeisuru Rou-
so Kaigi (The council to cooperate with the SDP) and Minshu Liberal Shintou Kesaei Suishin Rouso 
Kaigi (The council to promote forming liberal new party), which consisted of ₃₃ unions. These groups 
discussed participation of the SDP and the DPJ.₈₉⎠ They agreed to promote participation with the DPJ 
because forming a new party with wider forces was crucial for surviving the next general election.₉₀⎠ 
Furthermore, they were afraid of failure to unify the “third force” between the LDP and the NFP. If 
two new parties, one led by Hatoyama and another by the SDP, were formed, it would lead to the 
fragmentation of opposition forces.₉₁⎠
　　Through discussions among unions, on ₁₈ September, Rengo (Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation) announced supporting the DPJ in the next general election.₉₂） On ₂₁ September, heads 
of large unions including Jichiro had meeting with Hatoyama and Kan indicating support for their 
new party.₉₃）
　₂.   Electoral Support from Labor Unions
　　One of the clearest ways that labor unions support the DPJ is through sponsored candidates. A 
union selects one of their own members, the DPJ then nominates him or her but the union takes 
primary responsibility for mobilizing the votes necessary to elect the candidate. DPJ union sponsored 
candidates in both local assemblies and the Diet. In national elections, the DPJ mainly nominates 
them in the PR tier of the upper house. Labor unions also endorse and provide electoral support to 
DPJ candidates who are not directly sponsored by those unions. 
　( ₁ ) Candidate Sponsorship in the Upper House
　　Candidate sponsorship by labor unions has been common since the introduction of an elected 
upper house in ₁₉₄₇. The national district system used in these elections encouraged large 
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organizations such as labor unions to sponsor their own candidates.₉₄） After introduction of the closed-
list PR system in ₁₉₈₃, unions continued to sponsor candidates in the PR tier. Union candidates were 
nominated either by the JSP or The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Most union candidates in PR 
have been nominated by the DPJ since it was founded. After introduction of the open-list PR system 
in ₂₀₀₁, labor unions continued to sponsor candidates for the DPJ, as shown in Table ₁. 
　　In the ₂₀₀₁ upper house election, union sponsored candidates from the Japan Postal Group 
Union, the Japan Teachersʼ Union (JTU), Jichiro and the Confederation of Japan Automobile 
Workers (Jidousha Souren) (JAW) were elected. More union sponsored candidates were elected in 
₂₀₀₄ and ₂₀₀₇ due to increasing support for the DPJ. In the ₂₀₁₀ upper house election, though the 
party did not win as many seats, dropping from ₂₀ to ₁₆, the number of union candidate peaked at 
nine. In the ₂₀₁₃ upper house election, after losing power in ₂₀₁₂, DPJ seats in the upper house fell 
from sixteen to six, but all six of those seats were won by union candidates. Union sponsored 
candidates from Jidousa Souren, Jouhou Souren (Electoral Electronic and Information Union), Den-
ryoku Souren (The Federation of Electric Power Related Industry Workerʼs Unions of Japan), JTU, 
Jichiro and Denki Rengou (Japanese Electrical Electronic and Information Union) were elected. 
　　Some unions sponsor their own candidates in every election while some unions do not. For 
instance, in ₂₀₀₇, Kikan Rouren (Japan Federation of Basic Industry Workersʼ Union) nominated a 
sponsored candidate. However, they sponsored their candidate only in this election until the ₂₀₁₃ 
upper house election. Table ₂  summarized labor unions that nominated candidate and obtained 
seats constantly. 
　　These five unions sponsor two candidates, nominating one in every election. Sponsored 
Table1　Number of the DPJ PR seats and Union Candidates
　 ₂₀₀₁ ₂₀₀₄ ₂₀₀₇ ₂₀₁₀ ₂₀₁₃
The Number of DPJ PR seats ₇ ₁₉ ₂₀ ₁₆ ₇
The Number of elected union candidates ₄  ₇  ₆   ₉ ₆
 Source: Asahi Shinbun
Table ₂　Labor Unions and Membership
Labor Union Number of membership
Jichiro ₈₃₀,₉₈₇
Jidousha Souren ₇₇₀,₀₆₇
Nikkyouso ₂₄₆,₀₁₁
Jyouhou Rouen ₂₁₃,₄₁₃
Denryoku Souren ₂₁₄,₅₅₅
Source:  Rengo Website, http://jtuc-rengo.or.jp/anout_rengo/data/kouseisohiki_
　　　   ichiran.pdf?₀₄₁₈, Access Date: ₁ June ₂₀₁₆
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candidates in Jichiro, JTU and JAW have been nominated by the DPJ since ₂₀₀₁. Other two have 
nominated since the ₂₀₀₄ Upper House Election. Among ₄₉ unions in Rengo, the size of membership 
of Jichiro was second largest. Denryoku Souren was ₁₁th in terms of size of membership. UA Zensen, 
the largest unions in Rengo, also sponsored their own candidates from ₂₀₀₄. However, the candidate 
failed to obtain a seat in the ₂₀₁₃ elections. 
　( ₂ ) Providing Electoral Support 
　　Labor unions provide electoral support for the DPJ candidates in national and local elections. 
One type of support is the provision of resources. Unions provide both ﬁnancial resources and human 
resources. For instance, Jichiro bought ₂,₂₂₀,₀₀₀ yen party tickets of Aihara Kumiko, the DPJ Jichiro 
candidate.₉₅） Zen Toyota Seiji ni Sanka Suru Kai (Zen Toyota Labor Union Political Association) 
based on Toyota Labor Union donated around ₃₀,₀₀₀,₀₀₀ yen to Naoshima Masayuki as the DPJ 
Toyota and Jidousha Souren candidate in ₂₀₁₃.₉₆⎠ This was almost all of Naoshima koenkaiʼs 
income.₉₇）
　　Another type of support is mobilizing votes. Traditionally, unions mobilized votes through what 
they called the ʻTatewari Houshikiʼ (the vertical way).₉₈⎠ ʻTatewari Houshikiʼ is the way to collect votes 
from a particular union. Union candidates visit many prefectures before an election to ask for votes 
from union members. Unions help electoral campaign such as publishing newsletters to encourage 
voting to their candidates.₉₉⎠ Toyota labor union sent newsletters to around ₃₁₀,₀₀₀ union members.₁₀₀⎠ 
Unions also set quotas for members to collect names of their friends, families and relatives to form 
support groups, kouenkai, for their candidates. 
　　Unions also use education their members. They hold meetings with the candidate to make sure 
the voters recognize the candidate and publish leaﬂets about voting. Under the open list system, it is 
important to get union members to write the name their candidate on their ballots. If they write the 
name of a political party such as DPJ on ballot papers, the votes do not beneﬁt the candidate directly. 
　　Monitoring is another way to mobilize votes. Monitoring is to make sure that union members go 
to vote. For instance, Toyota Labor union encourages union members to go to use early voting system 
(Kijitumae Tohyou).₁₀₁） After going to early voting, they submit a certificate of completing voting 
(Touhyouzumi Syousyo) to their unions. In early voting places of Toyota City, member of the elections 
committee (Senkan) expected Toyota union members asked for proof of voting and prepared a lot of 
certiﬁcates for that purpose.₁₀₂） And, in fact, this increased voter turnout in Toyota City. In the ₂₀₀₃ 
lower house election, in Aichi ₁₁th district, voter turnout of early voting system was ₂₂.₆%, almost 
twice as much as other districts in Aichi Prefecture.₁₀₃）
₃.   Kouenkai
　　A kouenkai is a candidateʼs personal support organization.₁₀₄）,₁₀₅） It is not a party organization 
and is maintained and financed by the politician.₁₀₆⎠ The top of kouenkai is the candidate and the 
members include local politicians and significant business figures.₁₀₇⎠ Many have various divisions 
such as youth groups, womenʼs groups, former classmatesʼ groups, or groups for the elderly.₁₀₈⎠ The 
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common goal of the members is to elect their candidate.₁₀₉⎠︐₁₁₀⎠
　　Though kouenkai are not party organizations, they can play signiﬁcant roles for parties. Frist, 
kouenkai contributes to maintain seats and maintain electoral supports of political party. Their 
members are not party supporters. They do, however, for the partyʼs candidate, increasing the 
number of seats won by the party.  
　　Competition among candidates from the same party virtually disappeared after the electoral 
reform of ₁₉₉₄ and the introduction of single-member districts (SMD), and though kouenkai have 
declined, they have not disappeared.₁₁₁⎠ Kouenkai has still mobilized votes and provided resources for 
candidates. The DPJ candidates are no exception. They build up kouenkai and use them for elections. 
In the ₂₀₀₅ lower house election, the LDP won a landslide victory. The DPJ candidates who won seats 
were those who had strong kouenkai.₁₁₂⎠
　　Kouenkai help DPJ candidates get elected but also provide resources developing local party 
branches. Members of kouenkai often hold positions in both the kouenaki and the local party. 
Kouenkai thus help cover the lack of resources of new parties. After the DPJ formation in ₁₉₉₆, 
establishment of local branches was delayed in ₉  prefectures. Among them, in October ₁₉₉₆, the DPJ 
prefectural branches were formed in Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Kagoshima and Yamaguchi prefectures.₁₁₃⎠ 
Though the DPJ branches were formed, they were candidatesʼ kouenkai.₁₁₄⎠ Candidates provided the 
staff for the local branch.₁₁₅⎠ In Kochi Prefecture, the DPJ prefectural branch was formed relatively 
early but the DPJ Kochi was a part of the Goto Masanori, the DPJ Diet Member, kouenkai.₁₁₆⎠ DPJ 
Kochi was located in the Goto kouenkai ofﬁce. Goto kouenkai staff worked as the DPJ Kochi staff.₁₁₇⎠ 
　　The kouenkai is not a party organization. Kouenkai members may not even support the party 
while voting for the partyʼs candidate. However, kouenkai may increase party membership through 
their association with the partyʼs candidate. For instance, in Ehime prefecture, the DPJ member of 
Yahatahama City Assembly, Tsuzuki Hajime, asked his kouenkai members to become the DPJ party 
members or supporters in order to expand and strengthen the DPJ support base.₁₁₈⎠ In Hokkaido, DPJ 
Diet member Yokomichi also encouraged his kouenkai members to join the DPJ as either members or 
supporters.₁₁₉⎠ In Kochi, DPJ politicians did not transfer their kouenkai members into the party 
member automatically, but selected the kouenkai members who they wanted to join the party.₁₂₀⎠
Ⅵ．Conclusion
　　This paper argues that the DPJ is a ʻrooted new partyʼ though entrepreneurial aspects received 
more attention. Societal roots in labor unions and kouenkai are keys of the DPJ sustainability. 
Entrepreneurs play key roles in formation and growth of the DPJ. Entrepreneurs were important but 
the party survived after their failures and defections. The union movement provided stable support 
during good times and bad times. Kouenkai also contributed to the party organization. 
　　The DPJ case study contributes development of Bollyerʼs theoretical framework. New parties in 
Japan such as the DPJ were not included in Bollyerʼs study. Conclusions drawn from the DPJ case 
that roots in societal organizations are a key for new party survival supports the validity of her 
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theory in the wider contexts beyond her study. More importantly, the DPJ case study implies 
possibility that Bollyerʼs theory can explain new party success not only in advanced democracies 
withhold party system but also in advanced democracies in which the party system was disintegrated 
and reconstructed to “new” party system. 
　　This paper is a case study of the DPJ in Japan. To increase the validity of conclusions drawn 
from the DPJ case, future research will be required. Especially relevant would be studies of other new 
parties in old democracies with new party system such as cases in Italy. 
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